| Protocol | Year | Core Key‑Exchange | Cipher Suite | Notable Weaknesses | |----------|------|-------------------|--------------|-------------------| | | 1995 | Diffie‑Hellman (1024‑bit) | 3DES, Blowfish | No integrity protection, key‑exchange vulnerabilities | | SSH‑2 | 2006 | DH/ECDH, RSA | AES‑CTR, ChaCha20‑Poly1305 | Classical factorisation attacks on RSA/DH; lack of post‑quantum resistance | | GSSH‑001–004 | 2022‑2024 | Experimental lattice‑based KEX (e.g., Kyber, NewHope) | Hybrid (classical+PQ) | Prototype stage, limited interoperability | | GSSH‑005 | 2025 | Standardised, composable post‑quantum KEX (CRYSTALS‑Kyber, NTRU‑Prime) + fallback classic KEX | Hybrid symmetric primitives (AES‑GCM, ChaCha20‑Poly1305) with post‑quantum MACs (Dilithium‑based) | First production‑grade, NIST‑aligned, with full audit trail |
If GSSH-005 involves scientific research, the methodology might encompass: gssh-005
The purpose of GSSH-005, assuming it's a research project, could be to investigate a particular phenomenon, develop a new technology, or solve a pressing problem within its field. The scope might include: | Protocol | Year | Core Key‑Exchange |
If GSSH-005 pertains to a product or a technical specification: Blowfish | No integrity protection
The GSSH‑005 handshake can be modeled in the framework.
Overall, empirical measurements on a 10 Gbps backbone indicate compared to SSH‑2 when using session resumption, a trade‑off most enterprises deem acceptable given the quantum‑resilience benefit.